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THE MINER'S CANARY: TRIBAL CONTROL OF
AMERICAN INDIAN EDUCATION AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT
I. Introduction
Since the arrival of Columbus 500 years ago, Native Americans
have endured massacres and intolerance, racism and rapacity, altru-
ism and benign neglect. Federal policy originally favored the repres-
sion of Indian religious practices because religion was an indivisible
part of the native cultures that the American government sought to
stamp out through forced assimilation.I One legacy of America's mis-
treatment of its indigenous peoples has been an educational policy
that has run roughshod over Native American Free Exercise rights.2
Today, American Indian tribes widely seek increased control over
the education of their children.3 This position has received broad
congressional and presidential support since the Nixon Administra-
tion4 when the Special Senate Subcommittee on Indian Education rec-
ommended that the United States set as a national goal the
achievement of "maximum Indian participation in the development of
exemplary educational programs" for the following: "(a) Federal In-
dian Schools; (b) public schools with Indian populations; and
(c) model schools to meet both social and educational goals .. .
More than twenty years later, Native Americans are still fighting to
attain these goals. Federal statistics that rank American Indians as
our least educated, most addicted, shortest-lived citizens6 suggest tre-
1. VINE DELORIA, JR., & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN
JUSTICE 232 (1983 ed.) [hereinafter DELORIA & LYTLE]; see also FELIX S. COHEN,
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 242-43 (1982) [hereinafter HANDBOOK OF FED-
ERAL INDIAN LAW].
2. Likening Native Americans to the canaries once carried by miners to detect
poison gas, Felix S. Cohen characterized the Indians as a litmus test for the political
health of America as a whole on the issue of civil rights. Felix S. Cohen, The Erosion of
Indian Rights, 1950-1953: A Case Study in Bureaucracy, 62 YALE L.J. 348, 390 (1953)
[hereinafter Erosion of Indian Rights].
3. M. S. Mason, Rebuilding the Indian Nations, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug.
21, 1990, at 14-15 [hereinafter Mason]; see also REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE
JUDICIAL COMMISSION ON MINORITIES, Vol. 1, Executive Summary 60 (1991) [hereinaf-
ter NYS JUDICIAL COMMISSION].
4. MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 363,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1970).
5. SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON INDIAN EDUCATION, COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC
WELFARE, INDIAN EDUCATION: A NATIONAL TRAGEDY - A NATIONAL CHALLENGE,
S. REP. No. 501, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 106 (1969) [hereinafter A NATIONAL
CHALLENGE].
6. Robert H. White, Indians' New Harvest, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1990, at A27.
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mendous room for improvement in Indian education. Because of the
strong correlation between educational levels and general standards of
living,7 and the potential for education to preserve Indian culture, im-
provements in Indian education would have far ranging benefits to the
living conditions of Indians in general.
Moreover, all three branches of the federal government have recog-
nized the crucial role that increased control by Indian communities
must play in the advancement of Indian education.8 Although any
group of citizens9 could ostensibly make similar demands for im-
proved government services, due to the unique historical relationship
between the United States and its indigenous peoples, the Supreme
Court has recognized that "a moral obligation of a high order rests on
this country to provide for decent shelter, clothing, education, and
industrial advancement of the Indian."10 This moral obligation to
Native Americans stemming from their unique history has set Indian
education rights apart from those of other groups and has resulted in
the explicit legal obligation to provide special educational services to
Native Americans."
This Note discusses some of the legal and practical considerations
arising as Indian communities attempt to transform the rhetoric of
"Indian control" into the reality of quality education. Part II of this
Note traces the history of United States Indian education policy and
the special status of Native Americans. Part III examines the para-
mount tribal interest in Indian children and the attendant First
Amendment issues which lie at the heart of the Native American
movement for self-determination in Indian education. Part IV lists
potential strategies for the promotion of Indian educational control.
7. Janet Naylor, Four Fight for Favor in Fourth, WASHINGTON TIMES, Feb. 24,
1992, at BI.
8. See infra notes 75-129 and accompanying text.
9. Native Americans first gained United States citizenship in 1924, Means v. Wilson,
522 F.2d 833, 839 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 958 (1976).
10. Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U.S. 335, 355
(1945), reh'g denied, 324 U.S. 890 (1945) (emphasis added) (although treaty with Sho-
shone created no legal obligation, government has high moral obligation to provide for
health, education and advancement of Indians).
11. Prince v. Bd. of Educ., 88 N.M. 548, 556 (1975) (federal government and states
have duty to provide for education and other services needed by Indians). Furthermore,
the special guardianship of the federal government over Native Americans mandates that
monies appropriated by Congress under the obligations of treaties with the Indians are
treaty and trust monies which the Indians can lay claim to as a matter of right. A con-
tract, for example, between the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and the Bureau of Catho-
lic Indian Missions for the payment of such appropriations for the support of Indian
Catholic schools, made at the request of the Indians, does not violate the Establishment
Clause. Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908).
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This Note concludes that the key to Native American education suc-
cess lies with the encouragement of parental involvement, and the es-
tablishment of state-tribal compacts and tribal education departments
and codes. Moreover, this Note concludes that, despite some Free
Exercise Clause decisions that unreasonably hold Indian First
Amendment rights to a lower standard of protection than other reli-
gions, the First Amendment should not prevent increased Indian pa-
rental and tribal control of their children's education.
II. Background
A. An Historical Overview of U.S. Indian Education Policy
Education has been a critical weapon in the forced assimilation of
American Indians since the founding of the colonies. Although the
Constitution recognized the status of Indian tribes as sovereign gov-
ernments, 12 Congress has often used its plenary powers over the Indi-
ans 3 to further their subjugation. 4 Historically flawed assumptions
that only non-Indian educational systems were useful to Indian chil-
dren and that tribes had nothing worthwhile to contribute to their
children's education curtailed tribal and parental involvement in In-
dian education. 5 Early missionaries who assumed that America
would be a "Christian" nation (specifically of their denomination) suf-
fered immense hardships to proselytize the Indians.16 The inclusion
of education provisions in U.S.-Indian treaties from 1794 to 188917
illustrates the role of education in the "civilizing" of the Indians. Part
of the consideration for these treaty promises of education was the
cession by various tribes of almost one billion acres of land to the
United States.' I With the recognition of education as the responsi-
12. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, el. 3.
13. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
14. HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 1, at 139-141.
15. Melody L. McCoy, The Role of Tribal Governments in Education Policy: A Con-
cept Paper 2-3 (unpublished manuscript prepared for the National Indian Policy Center,
Oct. 15, 1991) (available from Native American Rights Fund). The author of this Note
wishes especially to thank Ms. McCoy for her advice and support.
16. Andrew Guilford, America's Frontier Missionaries, CHRISTIAN SCi. MONITOR,
Mar. 16, 1990, at 12.
17. See, e.g., Treaty with the Oneida, Tuscarora, and Stockbridge Indians, Dec. 2,
1794, 7 Stat. 47, 48 (federal government undertook to "instruct some young men of the
three nations in the arts of the miller and the sawer"); Treaty with the Sioux Indians in
Dakota, Mar. 2, 1889, 25 Stat. 888, 894 (education provision of 1868 treaty effective for
20 years). For a discussion of why treaty-making with the Indian nations was abolished
in favor of legislation, see HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 1, at 105-
107.
18. This cession of land secured treaty obligations that, along with the historically
brutal treatment of Native Americans by whites, has led to the official recognition that
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bility of public institutions, beginning in the 1880s, government
boarding schools largely replaced sectarian schools. 9 By the turn of
the twentieth century, the Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA") had de-
veloped an extensive network of off-reservation boarding schools20
designed to inculcate Indian children with the values of Western civi-
lization and to eliminate any traces of the children's native heritage. 21
Until the 1930s, the BIA took an essentially paternalistic approach to
Indian education - viewing schools and particularly boarding
schools as mechanisms for "civilizing" and "Christianizing. ' 22 There
are many expressions during this period to the effect that the BIA
based its educational policy on the assumed inferiority of Indians in
terms of religion, morals, and home life.23 In 1889 the Commissioner
of Indian Affairs demonstrated this attitude with a statement of offi-
cial policy that the American Indian was "to become the Indian
American. ' 24 Many Indian children in this era were kidnapped from
their camps or villages and taken to federal boarding schools where
their hair was cut, their clothing was burned and often students had
their mouths washed out with lye for speaking their native
languages.25
The late 1920s and early 1930s marked a dramatic departure from
many of the assimilationist policies of the previous era. In what the
Senate would later describe as "probably the most significant investi-
gation ever conducted in the field of Indian affairs,"' 26 the Meriam
Report of 192827 recognized the abject state of Indian education
under the federal boarding school system. The Meriam Report was
devastating in its criticism of two major areas that constituted the
most serious deficiencies in Indian administration: "the exclusion of
America has an obligation to provide its indigenous peoples with effective education. A
NATIONAL CHALLENGE 181, supra note 5.
19. HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 1, at 140.
20. Sally J. McBeth, The Primer and the Hoe, NAT. HIsT., Aug. 1984, at 4, 6.
21. Referring to the federal policy that "the Indian must conform to the white man's
ways, peaceably if they will, forcibly if they must," in 1889, the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs declared that the government's primary duty was "to prepare the rising genera-
tions of Indians for the new order of things thus forced upon them." Red Lake Band v.
United States, 17 Cl. Ct. 362, 452 (1989). Thus, education became an invaluable tool in
the government's attempt to destroy "tribal relations." Id. at 452.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. COMM'R INDIAN AFFAIRS ANNOTATED REP., H.R. EXEC. Doc. No. 1, 52d
Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1890).
25. McBeth, supra note 20, at 4-11.
26. A NATIONAL CHALLENGE, supra note 5, at 153.
27. Institute for Government Research, The Problem of Indian Administration (L.
Meriam ed. 1928) [hereinafter MERIAM REPORT].
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Indians from the management of their own affairs, and the poor qual-
ity of services (especially health and education) rendered by public
officials not responsible to the Indian people they serve. ' 28 Criticisms
included overcrowded dormitories, deficient diets, inadequate medical
facilities, and a daily schedule of work and study that was overly de-
manding.29 The curriculum was called unrealistic and classroom in-
struction techniques were found ineffective.30
In the wake of the federal government's acknowledgement of its
dismal record in Indian education,31 Washington transferred much of
the control in this area to the states.32 By the early 1970s, of the
roughly 250,000 Indian, Eskimo, and Aleut children attending the na-
tion's public, federal and private schools, some seventy percent were
in public schools, twenty-five percent in federal schools and five per-
cent in religious or other schools.33 In exchange for being the primary
provider of education for Indians, the states demanded federal subsi-
dies for the tax-exempt Indian lands that they would serve.34
Like the treaties and land acts of the 1890s, however, these laws
failed to provide for tribal control. 35 State schools lacked any obliga-
tion to offer education beyond the basic non-Indian curriculum until
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.36 Although
this Act failed to look to tribal governments for control of educational
programs, it did encourage Indian parental involvement in schools.37
The effects of the federal policy that existed until 1970 of terminat-
28. Red Lake Band, 17 Cl. Ct. at 452. Criticism of the unresponsiveness of the Bu-
reau of Indian Affairs to Native Americans continues today. Recently, a survey of gov-
ernment executives ranked the BIA as the least respected of 90 federal agencies-with the
Indian Health Service close behind. Nancy Gibbs, This Land is Their Land, TIME, Jan.
1991, at 18.
29. Red Lake Band, 17 Cl. Ct. at 453.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 452.
32. Id.
33. Daniel M. Rosenfelt, Indian Schools and Community Control, 25 STAN. L. REV.
489, 491 (1973). Today, in the wake of the closings of many federal Indian boarding
schools, more than 80% of Indian students attend state public schools. McCoy, supra
note 15, at 4.
34. This was accomplished through the Johnson O'Malley Act, ch. 147, § 1, 48 Stat.
596 (1934)(current version at 25 U.S.C. §§ 452-57 (1991)). Further funding was provided
by the Impact Aid Laws, Pub. L. ch. 1142, § 1, 64 Stat. 1100 (1950)(current version at 20
U.S.C. §§ 236-46 (1991)).
35. HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 1, at 683.
36. The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 102
Stat. 140 (current version at 20 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2713) took a crucial step in recognizing
and funding "special supplementary programs for the education and culturally related
needs of Indian students." Id. §§ 2701(a)(2)-2701(b).
37. Id. § 2701(b).
10231992]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
ing recognition of Indian tribes 8 illustrate the importance of tribal
authority in the preservation of Indian culture. After World War II,
both the executive and legislative branches sought to "terminate" the
special relationship between Indians and the federal government 39 in
order to force the integration of Native Americans into mainstream
society.' "Termination" contemplated the division of tribal assets
among members of the tribe and the implementation of a plan to en-
courage Indians to relocate from the reservations to urban areas.4'
Today, as a result of these policies, almost half of the Indian popula-
tion resides in urban centers rather than rural reservations.4 2
In the first official repudiation of the termination philosophy, Presi-
dent Richard Nixon, in a message to Congress on July 8, 1970,
announced:
Because termination is morally and legally unacceptable, because it
produces bad results, and because the mere threat of termination
tends to discourage greater self-sufficiency among Indian groups, I
am asking Congress to pass a new Concurrent Resolution which
would expressly renounce, repudiate, and repeal the termination
policy. .... 43
In the 1970s, tribes attained more direct control over federal Indian
educational programs and funding. The Indian Self-Determination
and Education Assistance Act of 1975 ("1975 Act"),44 for example,
resulted in some relinquishment of federal control to tribes in the area
38. Some of the consequences of federal termination policy were:
a. fundamental changes in land ownership,
b. the end of the trust relationship,
c. the imposition of state judicial and legislative authority,
d. the repeal of the exemption of Indians from state taxing power,
e. the end of special federal programs to tribes,
f. the discontinuation of special federal programs to individual Indians, and
g. the end of tribal sovereignty.
DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 1, at 20.
39. In 1953, Congress expressed its desire to end the status of Indians as "wards of
the United States, and to grant them all the rights and prerogatives pertaining to all
American citizens." H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
40. DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 1, at 17.
41. Rosenfelt, supra note 33, at 500.
42. See Sheppard v. Sheppard, 655 P.2d 895, 914 (1982).
43. DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 1, at 20. Despite this official repeal, Native Amer-
icans continue to worry about the loss of their special status and trust relationship with
the federal government. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe Education Code, Res. No. 91-272,
Ord. No. 91-04, § 102(d) (1991) (assertion that exercise of self-determination in running
schools on reservation land not an abrogation of other rights and powers) [hereinafter
ROSEBUD CODE].




of education. The 1975 Act directs the Secretary of the Interior, upon
the request of any Indian tribe, to contract with such tribe "to plan,
conduct and administer" educational programs within the Secretary's
control such as BIA-run schools.4" Furthermore, the legislative his-
tory of the 1975 Act reflects congressional concern with fostering In-
dian self-government" and declares its intent "to promote maximum
Indian participation in the government and education of the Indian
people." 4
7
Since the end of the termination era in the 1970s, Congress has
fostered Native American cultural preservation and increased tribal
control in Indian education.4" This attention to Indian culture was
due mainly to the resurgence of tribalism among increasingly vocal
Indian people that paralleled the civil rights movement and growing
multi-cultural sentiment in America at large. The Indian Elementary
and Secondary School Assistance Act of 197219 reflected this atmos-
phere by making tribes eligible to compete for certain discretionary
education projects and programs such as demonstration elementary
and secondary projects ° and special education programs.3 ' This Act
dealt with funding state schools in planning and developing "pro-
grams specifically designed to meet the special educational or cultur-
ally related academic needs, or both, of Indian children."'5 2 Funding
was conditioned upon program development in consultation with In-
dian parents and approval by an Indian parent committee; still, the
Act failed to provide for tribal control. 3
Similarly, the 1978 amendments to the Impact Aid Laws 4 failed to
address the issue of tribal control of Impact Aid funding and pro-
grams. Although the amendments are based expressly on the govern-
45. Id. § 450(0.
46. "True self-determination of any society of people is dependent upon an educa-
tional process which will insure the development of qualified people to fulfill meaningful
leadership roles." Id. at § 455(b)(1).
47. H.R. REP. No. 1600, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1974).
48. McCoy, supra note 15, at 5.
49. Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (current version at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2651
(1991)).
50. "The Secretary is authorized to make grants to state and local educational agen-
cies, federally supported elementary and secondary schools for Indian children and to
their tribes... to support pilot, and demonstration projects which are designed" to show
the effectiveness of programs for improving educational opportunities for Indian children.
Id. § 2621 (b).
51. Id. § 2622.
52. Id. § 2603.
53. Id. § 2604(b)(2)(B).
54. Pub. L. No. 95-561,104 Stat. 2222 (current version at 20 U.S.C. § 240(b)(3)
(1991)).
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mental relationship between the United States and the Indian tribes,"
tribes and Indian parents have input regarding only the funding appli-
cation process.5 6 Parents and tribes may also file complaints against
school districts. Such complaints are ultimately reviewable by the
Secretary of Education.58 Few complaints have been successful, how-
ever, because of the difficulty in obtaining the evidence necessary to
prove violations of the law.5 9
Another important piece of 1970s Indian education legislation with
the intent of fostering Indian self-government, the Education Amend-
ments of 1978o provide that tribes can set education standards for
federal and tribal schools that consider "the specific needs of the
tribe's children."' 6' This Act established the official policy, moreover,
of the BIA "to facilitate Indian control of Indian affairs in all matters
relating to education."62 The Tribally Controlled Community Col-
lege Assistance Act of 1978 further demonstrated congressional rec-
ognition of tribal sovereignty over Indian education.63 This Act
recognizes tribal governments on a par with state governments and
provides funding to colleges" that are formally controlled by tribal
governments.65
B. Special Status of Native Americans
The special status of Native Americans derives from the govern-
ment's historic treatment of tribes as separate political entities66
which is why, until the late 19th century, United States relations with
the Indians were almost exclusively through treaties.67 Congress has
55. Id. § 240(b)(3)(F).
56. Id. § 240(b)(3)(B).
57. Id. § 240(b)(3)(C).
58. Id.
59. McCoy, supra note 15, at 6.
60. Pub. L. No. 95-561 (current version at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2019 (1991)).
61. Id. § 2001(d).
62. Id. § 2010(a).
63. Pub. L. No. 95-471, 92 Stat. 1325 (current version at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1836
(1988)).
64. Id. § 1803. Because of cultural differences and language barriers, dropout rates of
Indians at traditional institutions of higher education have been high. However, the re-
tention rate at the tribally controlled community colleges is 89.28%; the dropout rate is
10.72%. The 22 tribally controlled colleges are located in 10 midwestern and western
states. Twenty of the colleges are located on reservations. The colleges are sponsored by
36 Indian tribes. During the 1988-1989 academic term, the colleges enrolled 16,787 In-
dian students and 4,208 non-Indian students, for a total of 20,995 students. S. REP. No.
371, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1825-26.
65. 25 U.S.C. § 1805 (1988).
66. HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 1, at 654.
67. ee id. at 107.
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plenary power to legislate regarding Native Americans.6" Indian
tribes, however, retain all powers of self-government and aboriginal
rights that Congress has not explicitly taken from them.6 9 As quasi-
sovereign nations, Indian tribal governments are subject to the U.S.
Constitution only to the extent that it expressly binds them or is made
applicable to the tribes by treaties or Acts of Congress.7°
Recognizing that the Bill of Rights, therefore, did not apply to tri-
bal governments, 71 Congress enacted the Indian Bill of Rights as part
of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.72 The Indian Bill of Rights statuto-
rily applied language from the Constitution almost verbatim - but
with a few distinctions. Congress pruned the First Amendment here
of its Establishment Clause,73 for example, in order to refrain from
undermining Indian cultural autonomy. 4
The judicial interpretation of the Indian Bill of Rights has consist-
ently supported tribal autonomy even in the face of claimed violations
of important individual rights. 75 Except for writs of habeas corpus,
the fashioning of remedies and the imposing of sanctions for viola-
tions of the Indian Bill of Rights are solely within the discretion of
tribal governments.76
Moreover, in addition to the legislative intent not to impinge on the
cultural autonomy of Indian tribes, legislation affecting Native Amer-
icans further suggests that the meaning of the Indian Bill of Rights
should remain distinct from the meaning of its constitutional counter-
68. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 3.
69. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 560 (1832). For a more detailed
discussion of the constitutional status of tribal governments, see Note, The Indian Bill of
Rights and the Constitutional Status of Tribal Governments, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1343
(1969) [hereinafter Constitutional Status of Tribal Governments].
70. Native American Church of North America v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d
131, 135 (10th Cir. 1959).
71. This Note does not mean to suggest that the Constitution applies differently to
Indians as an entire category than to Americans in general. Only reservation Indians, not
detribalized urban Indians, are beyond the jurisdiction of constitutional authority. See
David C. Williams, Note, The Borders of the Equal Protection Clause. Indians as Peoples,
38 UCLA L. REV. 759, 790 n.116 (1991).
72. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 77.
73. The First Amendment of the Indian Bill of Rights reads as follows:
No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall-
(1) make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or abridg-
ing the free exercise of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peacea-
bly to assemble and to petition for a redress of grievances.
Id.
74. Constitutional Status of Tribal Governments, supra note 69, at 1355.
75. HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 1, at 243.
76. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
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part." The federal government's trust responsibility7" for the Indians
has led to canons of construction that treaties and statutes should be
read, where possible, to protect the survival of Indian culture.79
Although the courts have occasionally violated s° this interpretive
rule, the trend in Congress toward supporting Indian self-determina-
tion and Free Exercise rights should eventually render such cases
irrelevant.8s
C. Special Nature of Indian Religion
One factor that distinguishes American Indian religions from West-
ern religions is the former's lack of dogma and doctrine.8 2 Unlike
most faiths, Native American religions (like the Amish culture) are
not limited to specific spheres of the lives of adherents. American
Indians tend to be near-pantheists, "their every act having religious
significance in their basic desire to live in harmony with the uni-
77. Constitutional Status of Tribal Governments, supra note 69, at 1355.
78. In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), Chief Justice Marshall
characterized Indian tribes as "domestic dependent nations," in a state of "pupilage,"
whose relation to the federal government "resembles that of a ward to his guardian." Id.
at 17. The Court later adopted the wardship theory of Marshall's dictum in Cherokee
Nation as an alternative source of congressional power over the Indians apart from the
commerce power in Article I of the Constitution. See, e.g., United States v. Nice, 241
U.S. 591, 597 (1916) (applying wardship relationship as source of congressional authority
to regulate liquor sales); see also Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252
(D.D.C. 1972) (in allocation of precious water in Nevada, the United States, acting
through the Secretary of Interior, charged itself with moral obligations of the highest
responsibility and trust). Although the federal government holds most Indian lands in
trust, the Indian nations in upstate New York generally hold "Indian title" to their lands.
NYS JUDICIAL COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 62.
79. Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930) (doubtful statutory expressions are
to be resolved in favor of the Indians).
80. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assoc., 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (5-4
decision)(American Indian Religious Freedom Act did not prevent the Forest Service
from building a marginally useful access road across an Indian sacred site); Employment
Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, reh'g denied, 496 U.S. 913 (1990) (holding 5-3 that, regard-
less of American Indian Religious Freedom Act, generally applicable law prohibiting
peyote use is enforceable no matter how burdensome enforcement is on individual reli-
gious beliefs).
81. Lyng and Smith will likely become irrelevant in light of pending legislation to
strengthen the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, H.R. REP. No. 1308, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1978, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1262 [herinafter AIRFA]. See 135
CONG. REC. S6219-02 (1991). For a more detailed discussion of AIRFA's implementa-
tion and official statement of policy of preserving Native American culture, see FEDERAL
AGENCIES TASK FORCE, U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM ACT REPORT (1979).
82. Joshua D. Rievman, Comment, Judicial Scrutiny of Native American Free Exer-
cise Rights: Lyng and the Decline of the Yoder Doctrine, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFFAIRS L.
REV. 169, 172 (1989).
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verse." 3 The pervasiveness of Indian religion in Indian life makes
tribal religious life and tribal social structure inseparable. In bringing
claims under the Free Exercise Clause, therefore, Indian plaintiffs
often assert that the loss of spiritual life will result in the destruction
of the tribe's social fabric.8 4
III. Tribal Interest in Indian Children
At the heart of tribal assertions of control over education lies the
tribe's assertion of its paramount interest in Indian children. 5 More-
over, because of the unique status of American Indians, 6 a tribe's
interest in its children has, in many respects, received more federal
deference than the interests of other parents in their respective chil-
dren.87 Such sovereignty issues are further complicated by the wide
dispersion of Native Americans both geographically across urban and
rural areas 8 and biologically through intermarriage.8 9
Although most of America's indigenous population lives in the
Western states in rural areas," there are substantial pockets of Indi-
ans all across the United States. In New York City alone, for exam-
ple, the 1990 census counted approximately 30,000 Native
Americans.9 Furthermore, a number of reservations lie in urban cen-
ters. The Puyallup and Okema Reservations, for example, are respec-
tively in the middle of Tacoma and Toppenish, Washington; the Gila
River and Papago reservations are in the Tucson, Arizona metro-area.
Rural reservations, in their isolation from other educational au-
thorities and ethnic or racial groups,92 pose the least sovereignty diffi-
83. New Rider v. Bd. of Educ., 480 F.2d 693, 700 (10th Cir. 1973) (Lewis, C.J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1097 (1973), reh'g denied, 415 U.S. 939 (1974).
84. See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Cemetery Protective Assoc., 485 U.S. 439 (1988);
Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1056 (1984).
85. McCoy, supra note 15, at 2.
86. See supra notes 67-82 and accompanying text.
87. See infra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
88. See Rosenfelt, supra note 33, at 491 n.4.
89. See Gary Sandefur & Robert McKinnell, American Indian Intermarriage, 15 Soc.
ScI. RES. 347, 348 (1986).
90. Rosenfelt, supra note 33, at 491 n.4. See also NYS JUDICIAL COMMISSION, supra
note 3, at 61.
91. The 1990 census counted exactly 27,531 American Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts
in New York City. Edward B. Fiske, New York Growth is Linked to Immigration, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 22, 1991, at BI. However, the census bureau admitted undercounting Amer-
ican Indians by five percent - thereby putting the actual figure closer to 29,000. Elaine
S. Povich, Commerce Chief Says Politics Didn't Play Role in Letting Census Stand, CHI.
TRIB., July 16, 1991, at C4.
92. Although most reservations are largely populated by Indians, in some instances,
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culties regarding increased tribal control. In contrast to their rural
counterparts, urban reservations, and pockets of urban Indians93 re-
siding outside of Indian country,94 raise the most difficult sovereignty
dilemmas due to conflicting interest groups and governmental author-
ities. Nevertheless, the strong federal recognition of tribal sovereignty
over Indian children suggests that in a contest between tribal and
other governmental or even non-Indian parental interests (as in inter-
marriage), courts and legislatures will continue the trend of tipping
the scales in favor of tribal control.
A distinction, moreover, lies between tribal and parental involve-
ment. Tribal control means control by tribal governments. Such con-
trol can be used to influence federal and state entities in the
formulation of educational policies. Parents, on the other hand, even
when organized in committees, simply lack the political clout of their
tribal governments to affect these policy decisions in any meaningful
way.
A. Federal Recognition
1. The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978
In the wake of the self-determination policies of the 1970s, the fed-
eral government has consistently recognized the paramount interests
of tribal governments in Indian children. Although it is not specifi-
cally an education law, the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978
("ICWA") constitutes a significant statement by Congress regarding
children and Indian tribes.95 The Act expressly states that "there is
no resource that is more vital to the continued existence and integrity
of Indian tribes than their children." 96 Declaring that "it is the policy
of this Nation to protect the best interests of Indian children and to
promote the stability... of Indian tribes and families, ' 97 the ICWA
many non-Indians reside on tribal reservations. See Greywater v. Joshua, 846 F.2d 486,
493 (8th Cir. 1988) (non-Indians are a majority on Devils Lake Sioux reservation).
93. Today, almost half of the Indian population resides in cities rather than rural
reservation-communities. See Sheppard v. Sheppard, 655 P.2d 895, 914 (1982).
94. If non-Indian owned land is allotted among Indian owned reservation land, then
the totality of the area is deemed "Indian Country" despite the presence of non-tribal
holdings. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1988) (ownership of land by non-Indians). Such hold-
ings will then generally fall under federal jurisdiction. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S.
544 (1975); Seymour v. Superintendent of Washington State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351
(1962). If allotment to non-Indians is extensive, then the Court may perceive a congres-
sional intent to diminish the scope of the reservation. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430
U.S. 584 (1977).
95. Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (current version at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963).
96. Id. § 1901(3).
97. Id. § 1902.
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grants tribes the right to intervene at any point in a state court pro-
ceeding for the foster care placement of or termination of parental
rights to an Indian child.98 The Act further grants Indian tribes ex-
clusive jurisdiction over custody proceedings regarding Indian
children. 99
Although the ICWA represents a recognition of tribal interests in
Native American children that bolsters arguments for increased tribal
control of Indian education, the Act has received criticism for sacri-
ficing the best interests of Indian children in favor of tribal inter-
ests."° Furthermore, the ICWA arguably failed to consider that
many children subject to its provisions are of multi-racial back-
grounds with little Indian heritage.' Although many American In-
dians are urbanized and have few ties to a tribe other than
membership, the Act allows a tribal court that knows little about that
environment to decide the future of such children.102
Despite such criticisms, courts have resolved to strongly enforce
the ICWA. In 1991, the New York Judicial Commission on Minori-
ties ("Commission") noted past lapses in the enforcement of the Act's
requirement that, among other things, the appropriate Indian nation
be notified when an Indian child is before a state court in an involun-
tary proceeding. 10 3 Consequently, the Commission recommended ju-
dicial seminars on the ICWA and a system of "monitoring custody
proceedings involving Indian children ... to ensure that there is full
compliance with the requirements of the Act.'
1°4
2. The Indian Education Act of 1988
The Indian Education Act of 1988105 further exemplifies congres-
sional recognition of the primacy of tribes regarding their children's
education. Congress declared that "a major national goal of the
United States is to provide the resources, processes, and structures
that will enable tribes and local communities to effect the quantity
and quality of educational services and opportunities that will permit
Indian children to compete and excel in the life areas of their
98. Id. § 1911(c).
99. Id. § 1911(a).
100. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 64 (1989) (Ste-
vens, J. dissenting).
101. Null, Note, In Re Junious M: The California Application of the Indian Child
Welfare Act, 8 J. Juv. L. 74, 84 (1984).
102. See In Re Junious M. v. Diana L., 193 Cal. Rptr. 40-42 (1983).
103. NYS JUDICIAL COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 62.
104. Id. at 64.
105. 25 U.S.C. § 2501, et seq.
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choice."' I°I The Act strengthens the role of tribal governments by au-
thorizing funding for tribal education departments. °7 Such funding,
however, is subject to the availability of appropriations;0 8 and, to
date, no money has ever been appropriated for such departments."°
3. The Native American Languages Act of 1990
The latest congressional recognition of tribal sovereignty over In-
dian education is the Native American Languages Act of 1990 ("Lan-
guages Act"). 10 Here, Congress declared the responsibility of the
United States to act with Native Americans IIIto ensure the survival
of the unique cultures and languages of the Indians." 2 This Act es-
tablished as the policy of the United States the "preservation, protec-
tion and promotion of the rights of Native Americans to speak,
practice, and develop Native American languages and to foster the
use and practice of these languages.""'
The legislative history of the Native American Languages Act sug-
gests the official cognizance of the value of increased Native American
involvement in Indian education.' "4 In sponsoring the Languages
Act, Senator Inouye cited findings from a hearing on "Culturally Rel-
evant Early Education Programs" before the Senate Select Committee
on Indian Affairs on November 24, 1987."' These findings strongly
indicated that where children are taught in their own languages by
teachers of the same cultural background who teach in methods ap-
propriate to that culture, "the results are that the children are
brighter, higher-achieving, and have higher self-esteem than their na-
tive counterparts schooled in other environments." '" 6 President Bush
noted the benefits of culturally relevant Indian education with this
106. Id. § 2502(c).
107. Id. § 2022b.
108. Id. § 2022b(a).
109. McCoy, supra note 15, at 9.
110. Native American Languages Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2901 (1990) [hereinafter Languages
Act].
111. Here, as in most modem legislation affecting American Indians, the term "Native
Americans" includes Indians, Native Hawaiians and Native American Pacific Islanders.
25 U.S.C. § 2902 (1). This Note, however, focuses on the historic plight of Indians and
Alaska natives.
112. 25 U.S.C. § 2901 (1990).
113. S. REP. No. 250, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); see also 25 U.S.C. § 2903. In
compliance with subsection 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the
Committee found that the enactment of S. 1781 would not effect any changes in existing
law. S. REP. No. 250, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1990).





declaration: "In approving this legislation, I recognize and acknowl-
edge the tribal colleges for the contribution they have made and con-
tinue to make in improving the quality of life for many American
Indian people.... [T]he tribal colleges are excellent examples of the
Administration's policy of self-determination for Indian tribes." ' 7
In furtherance of the government's objective to preserve, protect,
and-promote "the rights and freedom of Native Americans to use,
practice, and develop Native American Languages," the Languages
Act establishes the following relevant policies: (1) to encourage state
and local education programs to work with Native American parents,
educators, Indian Tribes, and other Native American governing bod-
ies in the implementation of programs to put this Act into effect;
(2) to support the awarding of academic credit for proficiency in a
Native American language on a par with comparable credit for any
foreign language; and (3) to "allow exceptions to teacher certification
requirements for federal programs" and other government funded
programs for "instruction in Native American languages" when such
teacher certification would hinder the employment of qualified teach-
ers - and to encourage state and territorial governments to make
similar exceptions.118
In light of the benefits to Indian children from culturally relevant
education, it is especially important that exceptions be made for
teachers who are qualified to instruct in native languages but lack fed-
eral or state teacher certification. Tribal elders may often perform
such instruction - which is desirable since many native cultures hold
their elders in high esteem.
Furthermore, a clear statement of federal policy is necessary to pre-
vent the extinction of native languages, to perpetuate native culture,
and to foster the enrichment of Indian children."I9 As Senator Inouye
declared: "If native cultures are to survive and if Native Americans
are to become full and productive members of society, . . . then the
United States must do all it can to protect and encourage cultural
practices."' 120 This recognition was at the core of the 1990 Native
American Languages Act. 12 1
Implementation of the Languages Act, however, faces a number of
difficulties. First, the creation of Native American language programs
117. Pub. L. 101-477, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1849-1 (Statement by President George
Bush upon signing S. 2167, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1990)).
118. 25 U.S.C. § 2903 (1990).
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is a very complex process. Even though many tribes have developed
their written languages to a point where curriculum materials and
textbooks are available for immediate use, for many other tribes such
materials are not available. Therefore, it would take considerable
time to develop such instructional material. In addition, for many of
the BIA-run schools, more than one tribal language is represented.
For example, the Sherman School in Riverside, California recently
had more than seventy different tribes represented in its student
body. 122
Aside from the difficulties of implementing native languages pro-
grams, such programs would be expensive to administer. The Office
of Management and Budget has estimated the cost of such a program
at approximately twenty million dollars. 123 Limited funding arguably
should be directed toward providing Indian students with the basic
skills needed to compete with their counterparts in public schools.
The undisputed importance of culturally relevant Indian education in
reducing drop-out rates (which are as high as eighty-five percent in
some schools)' 24 and in increasing educational achievement, however,
suggest that this twenty million dollars would be well spent. More-
over, such spending would constitute only a small percentage of the
present budget as a whole for Indian education.1 25
Another criticism of the Languages Act is that legislation of this
kind might cause Native American tongues to supplant English as the
main language for Indian students. An argument can be made that,
after Indian students receive their education, they must be able to
compete outside their reservation if economic development is to occur
in Indian country. The priority of economic development and the fo-
cus on educating Indian children to compete on the terms of Ameri-
can society at large, however, were the foundation of the now
repudiated assimilation policy of the past. As Congress and the Presi-
dent have recognized, Indian children do best in schools which are
sensitive to their own cultures. 26
122. S. REP. No. 250, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1840.
123. Id. at 22.
124. Salt River Announces Impact Aid Pact, COALITION FOR INDIAN EDUC. NEWSL.
(Coalition for Indian Educ., Washington D.C.), Sept. 1991, at 2.
125. For one source of federal assistance alone, Impact Aid, Congress has appropri-
ated $885 million for fiscal year 1992 and $935 million for 1993. See 20 U.S.C. § 236(b)
(1992).
126. S. REP. No. 250 at 4.
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4. Supreme Court Decisions
The U.S. Supreme Court has never squarely dealt with the issue of
Native American control of Indian education. The closest that the
Court has come to this topic was in dictum in Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe, which recognized the inherent sovereignty of tribes in
the area of education in Indian territory."' Merrion, which involved
a suit by oil companies to enjoin the enforcement of a tribal severence
tax, further declared that inherent tribal sovereignty includes the right
to "enact the requisite legislation to maintain peace and good order,
improve their condition, establish school systems, and aid their people
in their efforts to acquire the arts of civilized life."' 28 The only other
Supreme Court decision related to Indian control in education,
Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue,129 involved a dis-
pute over the ability of the state to impose a tax on the gross receipts
of contractors engaged in the construction of reservation schools.
Ramah declared in dictum, as Merrion had before it, that federal pol-
icy expressly encourages "tribal self-sufficiency in the area of
education." 30
B. First Amendment Issues
Native American control of Indian education raises a number of
First Amendment' 3' concerns. Some specific questions that arise in-
volve the following issues: the rights of Indian parents to raise their
children according to their religious, cultural and moral values;
whether government funding of sectarian schools serving Indian stu-
dents, the favoring of Indian culture and language and the preferen-
tial hiring of Indian teachers violate the Establishment Clause; 1 2 and
the parallels between free speech values and the merits of enhanced
parental participation in Indian education. The special status of Na-
tive Americans 33 and the particular characteristics of American In-
dian religions3 4 impact substantially on the answers to these
127. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 140 (1982) (quoting S. REP.
No. 698, 45th Cong., 3d Sess. 1-2 (1879)) (tribe has inherent power to impose a sever-
ance tax on mining activities as part of its power to govern and to pay for the costs of self-
government).
128. Id.
129. Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832 (1982).
130. Id. at 846.
131. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech. ... U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
132. Id.
133. See supra notes 67-82 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
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questions.
1. Free Exercise Clause Claims
The First Amendment dictates that Congress and the states'35 shall
make no law prohibiting the free exercise of religion. 136 Despite its
mandatory language, however, this prohibition is not absolute.
Although state and federal governments may not regulate religious
beliefs, they may regulate religious practices if the government can
show a compelling state interest in the subject matter and relate the
objective of the regulation to a "valid secular purpose.""'
A number of Supreme Court cases dealing with the Free Exercise
Clause have supported parental assertions of control in their chil-
dren's education.' 3  The case most relevant here is Wisconsin v.
Yoder 139 where the Court balanced Amish parental Free Exercise
rights with the state's interest in public education, and declared that
the First Amendment forbids governmental action that unjustly bur-
dens the rights of a religious minority to direct the rearing of its chil-
dren." As a crucial part of its balancing test, Yoder held that in
order for a claim to enjoy Free Exercise Clause protection from bur-
densome governmental control, such a claim "must be rooted in reli-
gious belief."'' Yoder stressed the fact that the Amish customs at
stake were an integral part of religious practices extending back over
almost 300 years. 142 Similar to the Amish, Native American customs
are inseparable from their time-honored religious beliefs - with the
added distinction of extending back for thousands of years.
The only mention of the Yoder doctrine to date in the area of In-
dian education has been in two Tenth Circuit cases 143 and one Colo-
135. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
136. U.S. CONST. amend I.
137. For a more detailed description of Free Exercise Clause Rights, see LAWRENCE
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1988).
138. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (state compelled attendance in formal
high school to age sixteen unreasonably interfered with interest of Amish parents in pro-
viding their children with vocational education under parental guidance); Pierce v. Soci-
ety of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (state compelled attendance in public school from age
eight to sixteen unreasonably interferes with interest of parents in directing the rearing of
offspring); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (statute prohibiting languages other
than English from being taught to grade school children unreasonably interferes with
power of parents to control education of their own children).
139. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205.
140. Id. at 213.
141. Id. at 215.
142. Id. at 219.
143. Hatch v. Goerke, 502 F.2d 1189 (10th Cir. 1974); New Rider, 480 F.2d 693 (10th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 939 (1973).
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rado case. I" These cases involved claims of Indian students and their
parents that school hair-length regulations violated the Free Exercise
rights of Indian boys to wear their hair in traditional braids.'45 In
both federal cases, the Tenth Circuit failed to even reach the Yoder
balancing test and dismissed the Indian Free Exercise claims for fail-
ing to state a substantial constitutional claim. 146 The Colorado case
held that the conclusion that a hair regulation denied an Indian stu-
dent his First Amendment right to freely exercise his religion was
outside the scope of unlawful acts prohibited by a state anti-discrimi-
nation statute.' 47 The Colorado court further held, however, that the
school board discriminated against Native Americans by requiring
that only Indians need special applications to obtain exemptions from
a hair length regulation. 4 s In holding the determination of Free Ex-
ercise violations to be beyond the scope of the lower court, however,
this Colorado case offers little to elucidate the subject of this Note.
In Freeman v. Flake,'49 the precursor to the two Tenth Circuit
cases, the plaintiffs claimed a free speech right to assert their "individ-
uality" through their hair style - which the court refused to recog-
nize as a protected "form of speech."' 50 The two Tenth Circuit cases,
Hatch v. Goerke 5' and New Rider v. Bd. of Educ.,52 dismissed Indian
claims based upon an application of the Freeman doctrine that man-
dated that only religion-based claims regarding hair length could in-
voke constitutional protection. 53 In dismissing the plaintiffs' claims
in Freeman, the court held that the desire of students "to express their
individuality" by wearing their hair in violation of school dress codes
without any claim of "religious discrimination" lacked any constitu-
tional merit. 5 4 Despite the fact that Hatch and New Rider involved
religious claims, both cases disregarded this distinction and followed
Freeman in affirming the dismissal of First Amendment claims. 1 5
Freeman stressed that the plaintiffs made no claim of "any racial or
144. School Dist. No. I I-J v. Howell, 517 P.2d 422 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973) (application
for exemption from school hair regulation was discriminatory where school board re-
quired such application only from Indians).
145. See generally Hatch, 502 F.2d 1189; New Rider, 480 F.2d 693.
146. Hatch, 502 F.2d at 1191; New Rider, 480 F.2d at 695.
147. Howell, 517 P.2d at 423.
148. Id. at 423-424.
149. Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1032
(1972).
150. Id. at 260.
151. Hatch, 502 F.2d 1189.
152. New Rider, 480 F.2d at 700.
153. Freeman, 448 F.2d 258.
154. Id. at 259.
155. Hatch, 502 F.2d at 1191; New Rider, 480 F.2d at 697.
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religious discrimination.' 56 New Rider and Hatch, however, placed
Native American students with genuine assertions of racial and reli-
gious discrimination in the same category as the students in Freeman
- who merely wished to make fashion statements. By holding that
the plaintiffs' claim was "based on nothing more than school regula-
tions,' 57 Hatch disregarded the claim of parents "to raise their chil-
dren according to their own religious, cultural and moral values, and
assert a deep belief of themselves and their son in maintaining his
Indian appearance by wearing braids."'
New Rider similarly dismissed testimony on the "cultural signifi-
cance" '5 9 of hair length in Pawnee tradition in favor of evidence that
Pawnee warriors did not generally wear their hair in long braids."6
The age of the boys (who were no warriors) suggests the absurdity of
looking at the traditional dress of warriors to discount the religious
sincerity of the plaintiffs' claims. Contrary to Freeman, where plain-
tiffs neglected even to raise a claim of religious discrimination, the
Indian students in New Rider ' 6' and Hatch 62 did assert such valid
discrimination claims.
Yoder held that, unless the government could show an "interest of
the highest order" which could not be served in some less restrictive
way, the First Amendment forbids governmental action which bur-
dens the rights of a religious minority to direct the upbringing of its
children.'63 Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit bent over backwards to
ignore evidence of the religious sincerity behind the Pawnee students'
desires to wear their hair in traditional braids.' 64 By forcing Native
American students to cut their hair, the schools in New Rider and
Hatch limited the ability of the boys' parents to raise their children
according to tribal custom. 65 Regardless of the debatable discipli-
nary necessity of requiring boys to wear short hair in public school, it
is difficult to imagine a public policy rationale for dress or hair length
regulations sufficient to overcome the high tier Yoder standard.
Even in cases involving similar hair length regulations in prisons,
where disciplinary rules have an arguably higher legitimacy than in
156. Freeman, 448 F.2d at 259.
157. Hatch, 502 F.2d at 1191.
158. Id. at 1192.
159. New Rider, 480 F.2d at 696.
160. Pawnee warriors generally wore their hair in roaches (a ridge standing up along
the middle). New Rider, 480 F.2d at 696.
161. Contra New Rider, 480 F.2d at 695.
162. Contra Hatch, 502 F.2d at 1191.
163. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
164. See supra notes 156-162 and accompanying text.
165. Hatch, 502 F.2d at 1191.
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schools, the courts are divided on whether such regulations violate the
First Amendment. 66 Hall v. Bellmon, and Teterud v. Burns, two cir-
cuit courts of appeals that have addressed this issue regarding prison
regulations arrived at opposite conclusions based on subjective inter-
pretations of whether hair length rules were reasonably related to le-
gitimate penological interests.' 67 Because such security interests as
the concealing of weapons in long braids are generally of greater im-
portance in prison regulations than in school regulations, however,
such prison cases are distinguishable here.
By nevertheless eschewing the Yoder test in favor of the low-scru-
tiny Freeman test, the Tenth Circuit and the Colorado court have
applied an indefensibly lower standard to Indians regarding Free Ex-
ercise claims. This indefensibly different standard has also appeared
in Employment Div. v. Smith, 168 a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision
regarding an Oregon prohibition on peyote use - which the Court
deemed not to be a violation of the free exercise rights of Indians who
used peyote for religious purposes. 169 Because it involves the unique
area of drug interdiction, Smith is easily distinguishable from cases
which involve Indian control of Native American education. Smith,
nevertheless, represents a further decrease in the protection of Native
American rights which Congress is currently trying to supersede
statutorily. 70
2. Establishment Clause Claims
The Establishment Clause, which prohibits any law "respecting an
establishment of religion,"' 7' requires that government refrain from
engaging in or compelling religious practices, or effecting favoritism
among sects or between religion and nonreligion.
7 2
The special status of Native Americans as independent political en-
tities and the modern policy of encouraging Indian self-determination
have resulted in the Establishment Clause being generally insignifi-
cant regarding laws that favor Indian religions or cultures. The ab-
166. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1113 (10th Cir. 1991) (hair length regulations
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests outweighed Indian inmate's free ex-
ercise right); see also Pollack v. Marshall, 656 F. Supp. 957 (S.D. Ohio, 1987); but see
Teterud v. Bums, 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975); Cole v. Fulcomer, 588 F. Supp. 772
(M.D. Pa. 1984); Teterud v. Gillman, 385 F. Supp. 153 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
167. 935 F.2d at 1113; 522 F.2d at 362.
168. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990).
169. Id.
170. 135 CONG. REC. S6219-02, supra, note 81.
171. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
172. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J.
concurring).
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sence of an Establishment Clause in the Indian Bill of Rights, for
example, suggests congressional recognition that such a clause would
be incompatible with the government's duty to amend its brutal his-
tory of near genocide and forced assimilation of the Indians."'
Through such legislation as the Native American Religious Freedom
Act 7 4 and the Native American Languages Act,175 Congress has
adopted the policy of preserving what remains of Native American
culture. Further legislation, therefore, favoring the appointment of
Indians to state school boards and the hiring of Indian teachers,1 76 or
tribal decisions to limit tribal school board membership to tribal
members, would not violate the Establishment Clause.
3. The Free Speech Nexus
Although Yoder 177 failed to mention the Free Speech Clause, the
Court in Employment Div. v. Smith viewed Yoder as being partly a
Free Speech case, and thus less significant as a pure Free Exercise
case. 17 1 Smith held that regardless of AIRFA, a generally applicable
prohibition on the use of peyote was enforceable no matter how bur-
densome such enforcement was to Indians who smoked peyote for
religious purposes. 79 In so holding, moreover, the Court opined that
Yoder was a "hybrid situation," which involved both Free Exercise
and Free Speech interests. 80 Smith implied that an exemption to the
students in Yoder would not have been required had only Free Exer-
cise principles been at stake.' 81 The future of exemption claims to
laws which impinge on religious free exercise appears to rest, there-
fore, on the presence of other constitutional interests such as the free-
dom of speech.
An examination of the values behind the Free Speech Clause, 182
moreover, suggests parallels between free speech values and the merits
173. Constitutional Status of Tribal Governments, supra note 69, at 1355.
174. AIRFA, 135 CONG. REC. 56219-02.
175. 25 U.S.C. § 2901.
176. Where non-Indian Bureau of Indian Affairs employees challenged employment
preference for qualified Indians provided by the Indian Reorganization Act, the Supreme
Court held that such preference was not impliedly repealed by the Equal Employment
Opportunities Act of 1972, and that the preference did not constitute invidious racial
discrimination but was reasonable and rationally designed to further Indian self-govern-
ment. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 547 (1974).
177. See generally Yoder, 406 U.S. 205.
178. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 882.
181. Id.
182. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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of enhanced parental and tribal participation in Indian education.
There are three core values of the Free Speech Clause: (1) the idea
that in order to make informed political decisions, the people require
freedom of speech and the free flow of information and ideas (the
citizen-critic model);183 (2) speech is protected as a means of discover-
ing truth through an uninhibited, robust exchange in the marketplace
of ideas, where all ideas enter on an equal basis and compete for ac-
ceptance as truth (the marketplace model); 8 4 and (3) freedom of
speech, independent of these two utilitarian theories, promotes the
personal, individual liberty interests of self-realization, self-actualiza-
tion and self-identity (the self-realization/actualization model).'8 5
These fundamental First Amendment values permeate judicial dis-
cussions of the functions of schools. The citizen-critic model reap-
pears repeatedly in Supreme Court education law decisions. In its
early flag salute case, the Court declared that the fact that school
boards are "educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupu-
lous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are
not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount
important principles of our government as mere platitudes.'
8 6
The First Amendment theory of speech as a vehicle to ascertaining
truth also finds expression in school law precedent. The college cam-
pus is a fertile environment for the exchange and dissemination of
ideas.' 87 The Supreme Court has repeatedly transplanted this market-
place model in education turf. In 1972, for example, the Court re-
ferred to "the college classroom with its surrounding environs" as
peculiarly the "marketplace of ideas."''
88
Justice Brennan's emphasis on the free exchange of ideas and
knowledge as an essential ingredient of an open society is closely tied
to the third primary value embodied in the First Amendment. Under
the self-realization model, freedom of expression is viewed as a good
in itself, or at least an essential element in a good society. This view
of the First Amendment also appears in Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 18 9 where
183. See N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN,
FREE SPEECH AND ITs RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 36-39 (1948).
184. See generally JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (1644); see also Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("The best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.").
185. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 804 (1978) (White, J.,
dissenting).
186. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
187. Spartacus Youth League v. Bd. of Trustees, 502 F. Supp. 789, 798 (N.D. Ill.
1980).
188. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972).
189. Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
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Justice Brennan, this time writing for the majority, relies upon past
decisions focusing on "the role of the First Amendment in fostering
individual self-expression."'" Brennan links "the right to receive
ideas" to "the recipient's meaningful exercise of his own rights of
speech, press and political freedom."''
Pico affirms the special value to the individual of self-expression,
thought and inquiry as ends in and of themselves - as essential goods
having importance independent of other more utilitarian First
Amendment values. Such judicial pronouncements of the tight paral-
lels between schools and the First Amendment 92 indicate that, in
their attempt to mold their children's education, Native Americans
and the First Amendment share a powerful bond.
The marketplace of ideas is curtailed when the ideas of Native
American tribes about the educational needs of their children are ex-
cluded. Intelligent decision-making based on free access to and ex-
change of information and ideas between providers and consumers of
educational services becomes impossible without meaningful parental
and tribal input in Indian education. Although the First Amendment
does not actually require the government to solicit increased Indian
involvement here, each essential First Amendment value (the citizen-
critic ideal, the marketplace of ideas, the personal liberty/self-realiza-
tion value) is advanced by parental and tribal participation in educa-
tional policy decision-making. Active government promotion of
freedom of expression would realize both the basic values of the First
Amendment and the vital educational mission of our schools to pre-
pare Native American children to function in the American society
that surrounds them while maintaining sensitivity to their specific cul-
tural needs.
IV. Potential Areas for Increased Tribal Control
Effective strategies for meeting the federal objective of increased tri-
bal control in Indian education include the encouragement of parental
involvement, and the establishment of state-tribal compacts and tribal
education departments and codes. In some communities, control of
an entire school district may be unfeasible and undesirable. Indian
control of less than a full school district may be possible, however,
190. Pico, 457 U.S. at 866 (citing First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
783 (1978)).
191. Pico, 457 U.S. at 867.
192. See Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Wilson v. Chancel-




through the administration of Johnson O'Malley,'93 Impact Aid con-
tracts, 194 or other government aid programs or through parent advi-
sory committees under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1981.19'
A. Title I
The complex pattern of government services to Indians has stymied
participation of tribes and individual Indians in federal and state pro-
grams. 196 The expense of the federal assistance application process
and the delays caused by the lack of interagency coordination often
deter all but the largest and wealthiest tribes. ' 97 One possible solution
to this lack of participation and coordination is the encouragement of
parental and tribal involvement.
Government has the resources to promote parental and tribal ac-
cess to educational decision-making under existing aid programs and
school infrastructures. School officials can use the initial, mandatory
annual meeting with parents under Title I of the Education Consoli-
dation and Improvement Act of 1981, 19 for example, to explain such
critical things as the following: the purposes of Title I and other pro-
grams for Indian educational assistance, and the active role of the
parents in sharing in decisions about the design, implementation and
evaluation of a program that will work for their children.' 99 Such
conferences could begin discussions with parents to structure ongoing
parental involvement throughout the school year and to make avail-
able to parents all communication at the school's disposal to sustain
inter-parent, parent-school, and school-parent lines of exchange.
Equally important, schools can provide essential training to parents
(for example, on leadership skills, conducting meetings, and analyzing
budgets), which studies have repeatedly demonstrated to be critical to
effective, ongoing involvement.2m
193. See generally 25 U.S.C. §§ 452-457 (1992).
194. Id.
195. 20 U.S.C. § 3801 (1992).
196. HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 1, at 676.
197. Id.
198. Any additional costs to the government, such as lights, heat, and staff should not
be significant. In any event, Chapter II specifically sanctions the use of school facilities as
community centers to meet a variety of local community needs, including education. 20
U.S.C. § 3842(2) (1982).
199: 20 U.S.C. § 3801 (1992).
200. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE (now U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVICES), TITLE I ESEA: How IT WORKS 24 (Pub. L. No. (OE) 77-07104,
(rev. ed. 1978)).
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B. Impact Aid
Impact Aid poses a good example of an Indian education program
that lacks tribal control.2 0 l Impact Aid provides general support
funding to school districts for basic education and support services to
Indian students - the level of such funding varies with the number of
Indian students that the state school district serves. 202 Current law
requires school districts to consult with Indian parents and affected
Indian tribes when developing Impact Aid programs.2 3
Indian input has largely been ineffective, however, since final deci-
sion-making authority lies with the state school districts. At the very
least, tribes should have the right to give final approval to programs
and funding decisions. In some instances, tribal education depart-
ments should receive Impact Aid funding directly and be responsible
for developing education programs. In terms of effectively transfer-
ring control of Indian education to tribes, the geographic, cultural,
and economic diversity among tribes mandates that federal legislation
and agency regulations recognize the specific service needs and ad-
ministrative capabilities of tribes.2" This type of flexibility would be
difficult to obtain; however, without such prerequisites, the transfer of
control of Indian education to tribes might lead to the erosion of al-
ready scarce and often mismanaged resources. 20 5
A landmark example of tribal control over Impact Aid is the agree-
ment between the Mesa Public School District of Arizona and the
Salt River Pima-Maricopa Tribe. 2°6 Under what may be the first
agreement between a tribe and a public school district, the tribe will
receive and administer the school district's Impact Aid funding and
provide certain Impact Aid services and programs.20 7 Since 1988,
when the tribe, through its education department, first became in-
volved in Impact Aid, the dropout rate for Indian students in the dis-
trict has decreased from eighty-five to sixty percent. 20 8
C. Rosebud Sioux Tribe Education Code of 1991
The 1991 state-tribal compact between the Rosebud Sioux Tribe
and South Dakota for the joint administration of public schools on
201. 20 U.S.C. §§ 236-246 (1992).
202. Id.
203. 20 U.S.C. § 240(b)(3)(B).
204. HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 1, at 676.
205. See Gibbs, supra note 28, at 18.
206. Salt River Announces Impact Aid Pact, CIE NEWSLETTER, at 2 n.70, col. 2. (Coa-





reservation land represents another model for tribal control of Indian
education. 2" One of the results of this compact was the drafting of a
Rosebud Sioux Tribe Education Code.21 0
Among its findings, the Rosebud Code noted the following: drop-
out rates for its schools which were almost six times the state average,
limited Indian studies curricula and Lakota language instruction, the
lack of an official orthography for the writing and pronouncing of the
Rosebud dialect of the Lakota language, the absence of hiring criteria
for teachers other than state certification requirements, and weak pa-
rental involvement.21  Among its goals, the Rosebud Code empha-
sizes the preservation and protection of the tribe.212
The Code creates a Tribal Education Department under the au-
thority of the Tribal Council.2" 3 The Code requires that the Tribal
Council establish tribal curricula, actively promote and assist coordi-
nation of tribal services and programs, seek grants and funding for
education improvement, and supervise Tribal Education Department
appropriations. 214 The Rosebud Code further applies Tribal law as
well as South Dakota state law to school boards.21 Moreover, the
Code, among other things, requires that the Tribal Education Depart-
ment devise tribal curricula and report on compliance of local and
other schools with such curricula.216
D. Other Strategies
The Languages Act represents another strategy for promoting tri-
bal control of Indian education through the general advancement of
the study of Native American languages and the waiving of certifica-
tion requirements when such requirements would hinder the employ-
ment of otherwise qualified Native American languages teachers. 21
7
Language instruction presents an area with high potential for the as-
sertion of tribal influence through tribal formulation of courses of
study which emphasize Indian culture - similar to the use of relevant
culture in any foreign language instruction. Today, there is a growing
awareness in Indian communities that a bilingual-bicultural education
based on Indian values and traditions presents a viable alternative to
209. Mason, supra note 3, at 15.
210. ROSEBUD CODE, supra note 43.
211. Id. at § 103(a)(l)-103(a)(9).
212. Id. at § 103(b)(1).
213. Id. at § 202(a).
214. Id. at §§ 201(4)-201(12).
215. ROSEBUD CODE, supra note 43, at § 301(a).
216. Id. § 402(e).
217. See supra notes 118-120 and accompanying text.
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the present educational system.218
V. Conclusion
The historic mistreatment of America's indigenous peoples is a
stain on the history of the United States which Congress has tried to
rectify. The generally dismal failure of our educational system to
serve the needs of Native Americans suggests much room for im-
provement in this area. In light of the recognition that Indian stu-
dents fare remarkably better when their education is sensitive to their
particular cultural needs, the key to Native American education suc-
cess lies with the encouragement of parental involvement, and the es-
tablishment of state-tribal compacts and tribal education departments
and codes.
Moreover, despite certain circuit court Free Exercise Clause deci-
sions that unreasonably hold Indian First Amendment rights to a
lower standard of protection than other religions, the Supreme Court
has generally followed the trend of Congress and the President of fos-
tering Indian self-determination through legislation to increase Indian
parental and tribal control of their children's education. Likening
Native Americans to the canaries once carried by miners to detect
poison gas, Felix S. Cohen, "the Grandfather of Indian Law," charac-
terized the Indians as a litmus test for the political health of America
as a whole.21 9 Cohen reasoned that "[O]ur treatment of the Indians,
even more than our treatment of other minorities, reflects the rise and
fall in our democratic faith. '22° In light of Cohen's apt characteriza-
tion of the significance of Indian rights, our ability to preserve Native
American culture has implications for the rights of all Americans.
John E. Silverman
218. Mason, supra note 3, at 15; see also Rosenfelt, supra note 33, at 507.
219. Erosion of Indian Rights, supra note 2, at 390.
220. Id.
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